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INTRODUCTION

Much of the work on the groups we usually call "mediating"
associations, including the subset we call "voluntary" associations,
proceeds from a flawed premise. That premise is that voluntary
associations-private groups that are neither State, nor family, nor
economic enterprise-are different in some fundamental way from
those other categories, particularly from the State and the business
enterprise. The usual model postulates a bipolar world with the State
at one end of the axis and the Individual at the other, with all the
other associations in society distributed between them. This gives rise
to the idea of "mediating" institutions, because in this model these
associations "occup[y] a middle position" and are "interposed
between the extremes;" they "interpose between parties in order to
reconcile them or to interpret them to each other;" they "negotiate a
compromise of hostile or incompatible viewpoints, demands, or
attitudes;" and they "act as an intermediary agent in bringing,
effecting, or communicating" the influences of the State and the
Individual.'
Under this view, analysis of such organizations is essentially
instrumental and asks what beneficial ends mediating institutions
serve in their interactions with the State and the Individual. For
example, Robert Vischer emphasizes how voluntary associations are
"valuable to modern American society" because they allow society to
"chart a middle path between the alienating extremes of excessive
individualism and collectivism," both of which are undesirable.2 In
contrast, Richard Garnett focuses less on the middle ground and
more on the important role of non-State associations in providing3
competition to the State in education and the formation of meaning,
and acting as a counterweight-his vivid phrase is "a wrench in the
works" 4-- to the State's impulse to hegemony. Jason Mazzone's
taxonomy of voluntary associations explicitly values non-State

1.

2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL

DICTIONARY

1402 (1981).

2. See Robert K. Vischer, The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Rethinking the Value of
Associations, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 949, 1019 (2004) (noting that the path between
individualism and collectivism generates conflict between associations, the
Individual, and the State).
3. See Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of
Religion, 42 B.C. L. REV. 771, 783 (2001) [hereinafter Quiet Faith] (questioning
whether it is possible for religion to be completely removed from the interests of the
State); Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Heny Adams's Soul: Education and the
Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REv. 1841, 1849-50 (2001) [hereinafter Henry
Adams's Soul] (focusing on whether the government's regulation of non-state
associations' role in education is overly burdensome).
4. Henry Adams's Soul, supra note 3, at 1853-54.
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associations to the degree that they foster participatory democracy in
the State. 5 The United States Supreme Court also emphasized the
utility of such groups by stating that "the constitutional shelter
afforded such relationships reflects the realization that individuals
draw much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.
Protecting these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty."6 All of these writers
share the idea that for purposes of civil society these 7voluntary
associations are, in Vischer's words, "important relationally.,
This instrumental approach leads to two practicaldifficulties. First,
the effort to foster the social goods that non-State associations create
by justifying them as valuable instrumentally-by focusing on their
effects on the State and Individuals-is unlikely to be successful.
Vibrant organizations capable of resisting the State and forging
alternative meanings that can compete with those officially
sanctioned by the State cannot be kept as plants in a carefully tended
garden, fertilized and pruned as the gardener sees fit. The Stateeven an inclusive, democratic one-is not, perhaps, the group best
situated to decide which organizations are or are not socially useful.
The second practical difficulty with these theories is that an
artificial distinction between different types of groups puts undue
emphasis on some kinds of organizations and ignores others. The
family, the State, the church, and the business enterprise have
historically been the primary forces creating individual identity and
our general culture. All other associations in society, while certainly
important, pale next to these. It is not a coincidence that much of
the legal history of the twentieth century has been the story of the
State's campaigns to bring the family and the business enterprise
more firmly under its control8 and to marginalize and trivialize
5. SeeJason Mazzone, Freedom's Associations, 77 WASH. L. REv. 639, 748-58 (2002)
(arguing that the Constitution safeguards and facilitates the ability of non-State
associations to work together).
6. Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
7. See Vischer, supra note 2, at 952 (stating that the import of the relationship

between associations, the Individual, and the State provides associations the power to
serve mediating roles).
8. Mary Anne Glendon has pointed out the interesting parallel developments of
family law and employment law during the 1970s, in which the State began enacting
no-fault divorce laws at the same time it began replacing the old employment-at-will
doctrine with the modem concept of unjust dismissal. See MARYANNE GLENDON, THE
NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 3-7 (1981). On the surface this is paradoxicalthe State is making it easier for any dissatisfied party to terminate a family
relationship but harder for a dissatisfied party to terminate an employment
relationship. But both developments resulted in strengthening the State at the
expense of each institution. By permitting no-fault divorce, the traditional family
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Yet business enterprises are regularly
religious associations.9
excluded from discussions of mediating institutions,0 even though
they have enormous impacts in shaping our culture, our political
landscape, and even the personal identities of Individuals. To the
extent we seek entities that can develop meanings that can conflict
and compete with those of the State, or act as a "wrench in the works"
of the State's drive for hegemony, or even act as an intermediary that
helps the Individual deal with the faceless world, business enterprises
fit the bill even better than most voluntary associations.
The observation that all human organizations are important
because of their relations with other organizations has some truth to
it, but as a building block for a theory of non-State associations the
observation is unsound. As a theoretical matter, it draws distinctions
between entities that are unwarranted, according a theoretical
primacy to the State that is undeserved and unnecessary. The bundle
of overlapping, only partially coordinated, and frequently conflicting
associations we usually reify as "the State" is not fundamentally

unit was weakened, and the power of the State over family members (including child
By restricting
custody and disposition of family assets) greatly increased.
employment at will, the State increased its power over businesses by subjecting more
of their internal operations to State control.
9.

See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF (Anchor Books

1994) (1993) (demonstrating how modern American political trends undermine the
importance of religious beliefs).
10. See ROBERT A. NISBET, COMMUNITY AND POWER 98-107 (1962) (placing
voluntary associations in opposition to the alliance of the State and capital); see also
PETER BERGER & RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE:

FROM STATE TO CIvIL

SOCIETY 158-59 (Michael Novak ed., 2d ed. 1996) (combining the State and market
enterprises into "megastructures" to which voluntary associations stand in
opposition); cf.JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL THEORY

130-33 (1992) (discussing the work of Talcott Parsons, whose concept of society
viewed voluntary associations as a sphere of interaction between the State and the
market); RICHARD A. COUTO & CATHERINE S. GUTHRIE, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK
BETTER: MEDIATING STRUCTURES, SOCIAL CAPITAL, AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROSPECT 38

(1999) (explaining how voluntary associations have protected liberty and community
See generally David E. Price,
from government policies and market capitalism).
Community, "MediatingStructures," and Public Policy, 62 SOUNDINGS 369, 391 (1979)
(arguing that the State cannot be the "prime creator of community life," and that
policymakers must think responsibly about the ethical impacts of community
Sociological Aspects, in 16
organization); David L. Sills, Voluntary Associations:
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 362, 363-64 (David L. Sills ed.,
1968) (excluding organizations that function in the market from consideration as
voluntary associations); Leonard L. Silverstein, The Third Sector Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY SPIRIT: A BOOK OF READINGS
299, 307-13 (Brian O'Connell ed., 1983) (distinguishing the role of the "third sector"
from that of the State and market-oriented firms by arguing that voluntary
associations both support and conflict with the State and business entities); David
Horton Smith, The Impact of the Volunteer Sector on Society, in AMERICA'S VOLUNTARY
SPIRIT: A BOOK OF READINGS 331, 338-41 (emphasizing the impact the voluntary
sector has on sovereignty and accountability of dominant institutions of government
and business).

2004]

SHARING SOVEREIGNTY

369

different from other organized human groups, and its primacy in
modern society is more a result of a particular level of technology and
the ability of those who control State associations to systematically
break down their rivals. Similarly, the associations we call "families"
and those engaged in economic enterprises are not substantially
different in their societal effects from the voluntary associations. In
Frederic Maitland's words, there is a "genus" of which economic and
non-economic organizations, such as Microsoft Corporation, the
Roman Catholic Church, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, and the Social Security
Administration, are merely "species."" Sociologist Robert MacIver
calls such groups "great associations," all of 12 them part of the
community but none of them coextensive with it.

The goal in this Article is to sketch and defend a view of
organizations that is fundamentally different from the instrumental.
To do this, I will first need, in Part I of this Article, to reconsider
widely held but wholly unsupported assumptions about the State and
its relations with other organizations in society. Much of this analysis
will rest on the idea of legal "pluralism.''3 In Part II, I will look closely
at the idea of "sovereignty" as it applies to the State. I will argue that
the idea that one particular group of organizations in society-the
ones we consider "the State"-enjoy all of the sovereign powers in
society is neither logically required nor supported by practical
experience. With sovereignty decoupled from the State, Part III will
then outline an approach to the relationship between State and nonState organizations that we might think of as "multilateral
associational relations."
I will conclude by arguing that this
multilateral approach not only better recognizes the inherent dignity
of these other organizations, but also has the practical advantage of
being the best way to foster the instrumental benefits we prize.
11. See Frederic William Maitland, Translator's Introduction to OTTo GIERKE,
POLITIcAL THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE, at vii, ix (Frederic William Maitland trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1968) (1900) (noting that State and Corporate species "seem
to be permanently organized groups of men; they seem to be group-units; we seem to
attribute acts and intents, rights and wrongs to these groups, to these units. Let it be
allowed that the State is a highly peculiar group-unit; still it may be asked whether we
ourselves are not the slaves of ajurist's theory and a little behind the age of Darwin if
between the State and all other groups we fix an immeasurable gulf and ask ourselves
no questions about the origin of species.").
12. See R.M. MACIVER, THE MODERN STATE 165-82 (Oxford Univ. Press 1932)
(1926) (describing how great associations such as the Church and the family have an
inner-life that is autonomous of the State).
13. The "pluralist" view, that law is not created by the State, but rather arises out
of many institutions within society, and that the State has no monopoly on legal
meaning is discussed in Part IV.A, infra.
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RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF THE STATE AND OTHER
ASSOCIATIONS IN DEFINING COMMUNITY

The first piece of my present argument depends on the claim that
the State is neither a special institution that constitutes the national
community nor is it the embodiment of popular sovereignty in
society. In MacIver's terms, the State is not the community but is an
association within the community, and is not fundamentally different,
except in purpose, from the other great associations.1 4 MacIver's
notion may strike some as wrong. After all, States are different-they
possess military force, interact with other States, and unlike other
associations, States enjoy "sovereignty" within their territories.
Sovereignty implies not merely that the State is different from other
associations but also that it is superior. A historical analysis of the
idea of the sovereign state helps illustrate this point.
A.

The Idea of the State

The modern idea of the sovereign State as a fundamental building
block of the world is, in fact, a very recent artifact. 5 As Daniel
Philpott has shown, the sovereign State resulted from the Protestant
need to establish legitimate authority for secular princes to resist the
Catholic Church's own claims of overarching authority.' 6 This
occurred at the same time as the rise of the idea of nationalism
(roughly the 17th to the 19th centuries) and resulted in the modern
nation-State.' 7 That State, with its claims to be the embodiment of
the national community, is a concept so natural to most of us that we
find it hard to believe that it would have been viewed as not merely
strange, but entirely absurd just a few hundred years ago.'8 The
medieval world was not a world of States and Individuals but a web of

14. See id. at 480-86 (theorizing that the State is a common channel that operates
to serve all facets of social life).
15. I have explored this point before in Franklin G. Snyder, Nomos, Narrative,and
Adjudication: Toward ajurisgenetic Theory of Law, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1623, 1635-43
(1999).
16. See DANIEL PHILPOTr, REVOLUTIONS IN SOVEREIGNTY: How IDEAS SHAPED
MODERN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28 (2001) (arguing that the authority of the
Catholic empire was one of several key elements that shaped the development of
global society).
17. See E.J. HOBSBAWM, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM SINCE 1780 18-19 (2d ed. 1992)
(describing how the concept of the "nation" in the nineteenth-century had grown
into a collective sovereignty that constituted a body of citizens and their
representative political expressions).
18.

SeeJOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS, THE DIVINE

RIGHT OF KINGS

13, 30 (Cambridge Univ.

Press 2d ed. 1914) (1896) (noting that the importance of the monarchy and the
aristocracy in medieval times would have made it difficult for medieval scholars to
conceptualize sovereign state power as it exists today).
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overlapping sovereignties, each strictly circumscribed, with no one
association capable of controlling the others. 9
Consider the first modern superpower. The sixteenth century
"Spanish Empire" of Charles V and Philip Ii does not remotely
resemble a bipolar Individual/State world.20 The empire was an
expanse of unrelated lands with different languages, cultures,
religions, and customs. These were linked together by a network of
ancestral property titles, religious sanctions, personal loyalties, and
private enterprise, in which merchant banks or the Church
frequently paid private contractors to provide such rudimentary State
services as military defense and foreign conquest.21 The churches,
universities, merchant banks, companies of condottieri, great nobles,
and native chiefs who made up the Empire were not "mediating
institutions," but rather they were, to a large extent, sovereign entities
uncontrolled by the Crown. The very recency of our concept of the
State suggests that we need to be careful in describing its primacy as
natural.
In the medieval ages, people viewed the world as under the
authority of Christ, with the human authorities exercising power in
the "spiritual" and the
His name through the "two swords":
"material" or "temporal." 3 As it happens, the doctrine of the single
temporal authority was, in the medieval world, almost entirely
theoretical. For example, when Emperor Frederick I claimed the
direct right to rule in God's name without being subject to the
Pope, 4 his claim was more aspirational than real. His Holy Roman
19.

See J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY

117-20 (1992)

(describing how the rise of urbanization from the twelfth to fourteenth centuries led
to the proliferation of scattered nation-states in western Europe); FIGGIS, supra note
18, at 38 (attributing the international struggles of the seventeenth century to earlier
controversies between papal and monarchal authority).
20. See generally HENRY KAMEN, EMPIRE: How SPAIN BECAME A WORLD POWER,
1492-1763 49-56 (2003) (describing King Charles V's struggles to restructure the
Spanish Government in order to better govern Spain's increasingly expansive
territories).
21. See id. at 50, 54 (providing a historical analysis of how during the first century
or two following Columbus' arrival in America, the Spanish state was essentially a
loose alliance of small polities, local oligarchies, and private enterprises).
22. See id. at 53 (noting that people in the Spanish territories in the sixteenth
century resisted the idea of a universal monarchy).
23. See Pope Boniface VIII, The Superiority of the Spiritual Authority, in THE
PORTABLE MEDIEVAL READER 233, 233-36 (James Bruce Ross & Mary Martin
McLaughlin eds., 1949) (discussing how the spiritual sword, wielded by the priest,

and the temporal sword wielded by knights and kings, are ultimately controlled by
the power of God).
24.

See Frederick

Barbarossa, The Independence of the Temporal Authority, in
259, 261 (James Bruce Ross & Mary Martin McLaughlin

PORTABLE MEDIEVAL READER

eds., 1949) (proclaiming that "whoever shall say that we received the imperial crown
as a benefice from the lord pope, contradicts the divine institutions and the teaching
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Empire was a welter of thousands of entities, some temporal and
some spiritual, without common language, laws, or culture, except
that which the Church provided, each with aspects of their
sovereignty that he was powerless to affect.25 It was not until the turn
of the sixteenth century-ironically the time that the unified
"spiritual sword" of the Church began to crack-that European kings
could begin to give life to the idea of a unified temporal sword. At
that point, changes in technology and finance began to give kings a
major military advantage over their rivals. 6 They found the old idea
of a unified temporal sword a useful propaganda device in their
campaigns to crush the nobles and control their own merchants.
The "temporal sword" evolved into the "divine right of kings," the
claim that all sovereignty was in the person of the monarch. 7 Shorn
of its religious aspects, it became the concept of "indivisible
sovereignty" and the idea that there must be one person or group
with ultimate unified sovereignty within any State. 28 The idea
of Peter, and shall be guilty of a lie").
25. Powerless in the legal sense, at least. Judicious use of subsidies, preferments,
and brute force could sometimes accomplish change in specific circumstances.
26. In the twelfth or thirteenth centuries, a collection of barons could easily field
an army as professional and well-equipped as the king-and they often did. By the
turn of the sixteenth-century, this became impossible. This is due in part to the
appearance of the cannon, which was first used by the Turks in the successful siege of
Constantinople in 1453, and to the development of firearms, which over time made
the armored horsemen and bowmen of the nobles much less valuable. See Richard
MILITARY
Holmes, "Villainous Saltpetre", in THE WORLD ATLAS OF WARFARE:
INNOVATIONS THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY 70, 70-72 (Richard Holmes ed.,
1988) (discussing the increasing importance of firearms in warfare during the
Reformation). Kings, who had larger financial resources than most of their nobles,
could afford the new siege trains and musketeers that gave them a decisive
advantage. Thus, from 1066 to 1485, for example, virtually every English monarch
had to weather serious uprisings among the nobles, and many of them-Stephen,
Henry II, John, Henry III, Edward II, Richard II, Henry VI, Edward IV, and Richard
Il-were at one point or another killed in battle, captured, defeated militarily,
forced to flee the country, or compelled to make concessions by military force. But
from ascension of Henry VII in 1485, English monarchs had few difficulties putting
down rebellious subjects until control of the central government power passed to
Parliament in the mid-seventeenth century. The same process was happening at the
same time in other countries. In France, the power of the nobles was largely curbed
over the reign of Louis XI, who died in 1483, by which point nearly all of France was
under effective royal control, while in Spain the joining of the crowns of Castile and
Aragon in 1479 under Ferdinand and Isabella led to the unification of Spain under
central royal authority within little more than a decade. After this, the risk that a
handful of disgruntled nobles could overthrow the king was small; the later wars that
challenged royal authority were no longer baronial squabbles but great popular
causes, like the English Civil War, the French Wars of Religion, and the Dutch War of
Independence from Spain.
27. See FiGGis, supra note 18, at 13-14 (analyzing the relationship between
sovereignty and the supremacy of papal and monarchal authority during the middle
ages).
28. SeeJEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH 80-83 (M. J. Tooley trans.,
The MacMillan Co. 1955) (1576) (introducing the phrase "indivisible sovereignty"
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powerfully influenced English thought and much of the modern
Harold Laski
world 29 through the work of Thomas Hobbes.3 0
characteristically described that world-view:
[W]e cannot avoid the temptation that bids us make our State a
unity. It is to be all-absorptive. All groups within itself are to be but
the ministrants to its life; their reality is the outcome of its
sovereignty, since without it they could have no existence. Their
goodness is gained only through the overshadowing power of its
presence. It alone, so to speak, eternally is; while they exist but to
the extent to which its being implies them. The All, America,
includes, 'implicates' in James' phrase, its constituent states. They
are one with it and of it-one and indivisible. Each has its assigned
place and function in the great Whole which gives them life. This
l 'a
havepredicated
what Mr. unity.v
Bradley calls
is essential; for otherwise we should the
to destroy
plurality of reals'; which is
But as Laski recognizes, his argument is still much more
theological (one with roots in such thinkers as Dante, Aquinas, and
Boniface VIII) than it is a description of the real world.2
It is a common view that the State is the sole embodiment of a
community. It has been in the interest of State officials to insist on
such an idea. But we must question whether there is any real
difference between, for example, the private British East India
Company, which controlled most of a subcontinent,3 3 and the present
By
government of Somalia, which controls virtually nothing. 4
and discussing the roles officers of state play in sovereign governmental bodies).
29. Edmund Sears Morgan presents an interesting, if rather cynical, take on this
development of popular sovereignty. EDMUND SEARS MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE:
THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERIcA 13-15, 58-59 (1989)

(arguing that the rise of popular sovereignty was effectively a fiction designed to
cover continued elitist governance).
30. See D.B. Robertson, Hobbes's Theory of Associations in the Seventeenth-Century
Milieu, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS: A STUDY OF GROUPS IN FREE SOCIETIES 109, 109
(D.B. Robertson ed., 1966) (stating that Hobbes considered the proliferation of

voluntary groups in the seventeenth century dangerous to the sustainment of the
monarchal state).
31.

HAROLDJ. LASKI, STUDIES IN THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY 1

(1917).

32. See id. at 3-4 (conceding that the monistic interests of citizens are subject to
"the reality of the State's personality").
33. See PERCIVAL GRIFFITH, THE BRITISH IMPACT ON INDIA 143-53 (1952); 1 SIR
WILLIAM WILSON HUNTER, A HISTORY OF BRITISH INDIA (1899) (describing the origins
of the Company's control of the subcontinent); see generally JANICE E. THOMPSON,
STATE-BuILDING AND EXTRATERRITORIAL
MERCENARIES, PIRATES, AND SOVEREIGNS:

(1994) (discussing the relationship between
"private" and "public" uses of force in European colonial expansion).
34. Currently, the "government" of Somalia is actually in Kenya because it
controls no part of the country, which is "a patchwork of fiefs divided among armed
militias representing the various clans." Marc Lacey, Somalia Leader, in Kenya Exile,
Asks U.N. to Help Disarm Militias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2004, at A6; see generally ANNA
SOMALIA UNDONE (1994) (tracing the
SIMONS, NETWORKS OF DISSOLUTION:
VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:365

insisting on such a distinction, we may be, to some degree, Maitland's
"slaves of ajurist's theory" 5 or even slaves of the theologians.
There is a very old strand of thought that has, over the last 200
years or so, stood in opposition to the idea that the State is the
embodiment of the community and the unified expression of its
sovereignty. Some of that thought is present in the structure of the
original United States Constitution, with its talk of powers "delegated
to" the national government, or "reserved" to the States or, more
obscurely "to the people. 36 It evinces a notion that the State and the
civic polity are not identical. 7
This school of thought is usually called "pluralist," and it implies
the idea that the sovereignty of any community is not unitary but is
exercised jointly by any number of associations within the society. It
has never been a popular idea, but it has never quite died out, even
in the face of the modern mega-State. In Europe and America, it
remained alive in the works of such writers as Maitland, Laski, Otto
von Gierke, 8 John Neville Figgis,3 9 Mark DeWolfe Howe, 4 Robert
Maclver,4' and Robert Cover,42 all of whom have, in the face of the

disintegration of Somalia).
35. Maitland is referring to the process whereby individuals tend to conform
their observations of reality to their preexisting notions. If we start from the idea
that there is some kind of unified, singular sovereignty, we will interpret institutions
in that light. If we start by observing reality, however, we would be hard-put to derive
any such idea from the conflicting and contradictory mechanisms that we see in the
real world. Maitland, supranote 11, at ix.
36. U.S. CONsT.

amend. X.

37. Such a view is not a contemporary phenomenon; it can be seen in James
Madison's view of the conflicting groups within the Republic. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 16-23 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed.,Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 2d
ed. 1981) (1787) [hereinafter THE FEDERALIST No. 10] (describing the role of the
republic to prevent factions of citizens from imposing their views on those outside of
the faction).
38.

See OTro GIERKE, NATURAL LAW AND THE THEORY OF SOCIEY: 1500 TO 1800 70-

79 (Ernest Barker trans., Beacon Press 1960) (1868) (discussing the federalist
interpretation of the role of associations in society as being equal to and
independent of the State).
39. See Ficcs, supra note 18, at 256-66 (concluding that the medieval belief that
the monarch was divinely appointed was necessary to transition government away
from the influence of the Church and towards a more pluristic political structure, of
which the Church and the government were important components).

40. See Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreword: Political
Theoy and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARv. L. REv. 91, 91-92 (1953) (claiming that
despite distinguishing between the liberties afforded to associations and individuals,
the mere fact that the Court recognized certain liberties due to organizations

represented "a step towards pluralism").
41.

See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 165-82 (discussing the relationship between the

state and "great associations" and concluding that each are equally autonomous).
42. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 61-62, 67-68 (1983) (claiming that both government
and other institutions impact the interpretation of the laws of the State).
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monistic State, stubbornly held to a vision of associational pluralism. 43
Howe, perhaps, said it most plainly:
The heart of the pluralistic thesis is the conviction that government
must recognize that it is not the sole possessor of sovereignty, and
that private groups within the community are entitled to lead their
own free lives and exercise within the area of their competence an
authority so effective as to justify labeling it a sovereign authority.4
The key word here is "entitled." The issue is not one of granting
"limited sovereignty" from the State to certain kinds of associations, 45
but rather it is one of recognizing that associations have a right to be
left alone that is as fundamental as the similar rights enjoyed by the
Individual.
Our modem minds have substituted one picture of the world for
another (the sovereign State for the unified temporal sword), but this
picture still does not reflect the reality. Even in our modern society,
the concept we call the State is not a unified entity at all. Rather, it is
an aggregation of things tangible (people, land, goods) and
intangible (history, ideals, culture) organized for particular purposes.
It is an association of people and things-more accurately, a group of
associations, "a loose coalition of more or less independent
collectivities, ''47 which frequently overlap and not infrequently conflict
with each other. We use the term "State" as a handy euphemism for
this network of associations.
And these State associations are not easily distinguishable in their
attributes from other associations. De Tocqueville famously observed
that in 1830s America, voluntary associations played a much larger
role than they did in Europe. 4" Faced with a problem, the French
43.

I have previously outlined the connections among many of these writers, with

a particular emphasis on Cover. See Snyder, supranote 15.
44. Howe, infra note 40, at 91.
45. Cf Vischer, supra note 2, at 1020 (arguing that although associations have a
degree of autonomy that allows them to "facilitate shared meaning among its
members," such autonomy is not without bounds). Associations operate within the
limits set forth by the State, particularly in areas where the State has a pressing
interest. Id. They function as bridges between the State and the individual, and as

such are accountable to both. Id. This notion is consistent with the idea of limited
sovereignty. Id.
46. See generally C.S. LEwIS, THE DISCARDED IMAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDIEVAL
AND RENAISSANCE LITERATURE (1964) (providing a useful comparison of the worldpictures of the medieval and modern worlds).
47. Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1215
(1994) (explaining that this view of the State stems from the enormous scope of
government operations).
48. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 504-06 (Harvey C.
Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds., trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2000) (1835)
(exemplifying how Americans, unlike Europeans, turn to voluntary associations such
as the Church to achieve their self-interests).
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tended to turn to the government, the British to their aristocracy,
while Americans formed associations to deal with the problem.4

9

This

may suggest something about a uniquely American role for these
associations, 50 but it also reveals that the State and voluntary
associations can interchangeably perform (and have performed)
many of the same functions, including the maintenance of public
order and defense. Much of the change in voluntary associations
over the last hundred years can be explained more by the fact that
many of their functions-providing charity, education, or life
insurance, offering public entertainments, building roads-have
been taken over by more efficient providers, usually the State or a
business enterprise. The increasing move to contract out services
previously seen as public to private organizations further blurs the
distinction.
The features that many commentators find in voluntary
Vischer, for
associations are also found in State associations.
he
institutions
of
the
mediating
example, lists four characteristics
Yet State
studies: identity, expression, purpose, and meaning.
49. See id. at 250.
50. The heavy reliance on associations in America may be misleading. After all,
there was no aristocracy in the young United States and the legal structure set up for
the government was designed to be feeble, so anything requiring concerted action
required action by organized non-State groups. Whether this marks some uniquely
"American" attachment to non-State organizations, or simply reflects the particular
structural constraints of America before the Civil War is unclear. Earlier generations
in America had little difficulty in consigning large responsibilities to government. As
Professor Christopher Wolfe has noted:
In early America, the legitimacy of morals legislation was widely accepted.
Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, points out that colonial penal laws,
derived largely from Scripture, were very rigorous (at least on paper): "The
chief care of the legislators in this body of penal laws was the maintenance of
orderly conduct and good .morals in the community; thus they constantly
invaded the domain of conscience, and there was scarcely a sin which was
not subject to magisterial censure." He goes on to mention laws regarding
rape and adultery, fornication, idleness and drunkenness, (injurious) lying,
and requirement of attendance at religious services (and prohibition of
nonconforming religious services). He adds that "the zeal for regulation
induces him [the legislator] to descend to the most frivolous particulars:
thus a law is to be found in the same code which prohibits the use of
tobacco."
Christopher Wolfe, Public Morality and the Modern Supreme Court, 45 AM.J.JuRIs. 65, 69
(2000) (internal citations omitted). Thus, we may be attributing to those antebellum
Americans a preference for voluntary action when what we actually see is a lack of
resources for any other kind. Cf Hernando De Soto, What's Wrong With Latin
American Economies, REASON, Oct. 1989, at 39-40 (noting that a sociologist visiting

Peru might erroneously conclude that Peruvians "prefer" to work in smaller familydominated firms rather than larger corporate entities; but in fact the predominance
of family firms reflects nothing more than the lack of an efficient and honest legal
system that would enforce promises among strangers).
51. See Vischer, supra note 2, at 960 (noting that these values are actually
subcategories of the tension between associations, the Individual, and the State).
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associations seem to embody each of these values at least as well as
most of the groups that fit any of the standard definitions of
voluntary associations.
The State certainly provides identity because it invites "individuals to
join together to pursue or maintain a common identity."52 Especially
in the wake of the destruction of the World Trade Center and the
2003 war in Iraq, it is difficult to argue that membership in the
American State is unimportant to Americans' sense of their
individual identity. With respect to expression, the State provides "a
voice in the world" for its "members' views and values'5 3 in thousands
of ways, from encouraging reading and discouraging abortions, to
preserving the wilderness.54 As to purpose, the State enables its
55
members to 'join together in pursuit of a common purpose,
whether that purpose is waging war, caring for the poor, or
preventing subdivision lots less than one-half acre in size. And as for
meaning, which Vischer equates with autonomy, if it is true that
"associations require as much autonomy as possible to pursue their
members' chosen priorities and values,, 56 and that this allows them to
develop their own meanings, it is hard to find a more autonomous
entity than the State.
Nor is the "mediating" function of non-State associations different
from the role that the State itself plays. Certainly the family, the
church, the business, and the voluntary organization all mediate
between the State and the Individual. But these organizations all
mediate with each other in every conceivable combination-the
family with the church, the church with the voluntary association, and
the voluntary association with the business. The State also mediates
with all of them. The voluntary association may step between the
Individual and the State, but the State may step between the
Individual and the voluntary association.57 The true picture is not a
pole, with the State on one end and the other associations in the
middle, but a dense web, where all the various associations, State and
52. Id. at 965.
53. Id. at 978.
54. The State's speech can have at least as powerful an effect on public discourse
as that of any other organization. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, The Language of the Arms
Race: Should the People Limit Government Speech?, 64 B.U. L. REV. 961, 993-96 (1984)
(arguing to restrict the State's power to communicate, particularly in areas where the
State's biases are not countered by alternative perspectives).
55. Vischer, supranote 2, at 986.

56. Id. at 1000.
57. Compare Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984)
(compelling a private non-State association to admit women members), with Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000) (permitting a private non-State

association to exclude homosexuals).
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non-State, interact with and influence each other, and in which
variant meanings and value systems flourish like plants in a tropical
garden. 58
Some might object that the State is different from other types of
associations in that it is not voluntary. To live within the United
States is to be subject to the American State, but that distinction is
more a matter of degree than it is of kind. Certainly the State is an
association that is more difficult to exit than, for example, the Sierra
Club or a bowling league, but so is a family, a church, or the market
economy. Most State associations are, in fact, voluntary, even for
those who reside within the State. I have no obligation to join the
Coast Guard or work for the State of California. If I do not like the
Fort Worth City Council, I can move to Arlington. If I do not choose
to be a Texan, I can move to New Jersey. If I decide I no longer want
to be an American, I can go to France or, if I prefer someplace
lacking any resemblance to a State, Somalia. True, unless I move to
Somalia, I will have to live somewhere within some kind of State, but
that does not make my choice of states involuntary. Biology forces all
human beings to be part of a family, and circumstances force people
and organizations to be part of an economy; membership is no more
voluntary than is the membership of the State. 59 The voluntary
nature of membership, thus, is not a ground on which we can
distinguish States from other kinds of entities.
B.

The Role of Business Enterprises

In our modern world business enterprises perform much the same
functions as the state and voluntary associations. The exclusion of
business enterprises from most discussions of voluntary associations is
interesting, given that the Walt Disney Co., for example, is as much a
voluntary association as Amnesty International-both organizations
are aggregations of people and property working together to
accomplish particular purposes. If we consider Vischer's factors
again,60 businesses and their products, are important in shaping the
58. See Snyder, supra note 15, at 1708 (arguing that law is a product of the
relationships between different groups and the procedures groups use to interact
with each other).
59. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 483-84 n.1 (noting similarities between the
membership of the State, familial relations, and a connection to an economic
system). Maclver adds: "Ifthe [S)tate is unique in its own way, so are the other
associations in their ways. And if the [S]tate is absolutely necessary to our social life,
so are they also." Id. at 484.
60. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing how identity,
expression, purpose, and meaning are common to both State associations and

voluntary associations).
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identities of Individuals. Working for Sullivan & Cromwell or
General Electric or the New York Times, riding a Harley-Davidson
motorcycle, wearing Nike shoes, or drinking Starbucks coffee all
influence and shape the identity of the Individual. 6'
Business
enterprises are also relentlessly engaged in expression-some of it
designed to sell products, some of it designed to influence the
political process, and some of it designed to do nothing more than
promote a worthy cause. Business associations plainly permit their
members to join together in a common purpose, and their purposes
are furthered by granting them substantial autonomy.
The exclusion of business enterprises from the discussion is
probably best understood not as a reflection of any analytical
difference but rather as the political and aesthetic preferences of
those who have written on voluntary associations. Many of these
writers tend to work backwards. They see something that they find
valuable, whether participatory democracy, religious belief, or smalltown values. They note that these values are reflected or developed
by certain associations, such as the NAACP, the Baptist church, or the
suburban homeowners' association.
Because they view these
institutions instrumentally, as a means to achieve the desired value,
they tend to develop theories that these groups (though not others)
should be favored by (or at least protected from) the State. 62
Thus, Robert Nisbet and Richard Couto both see the alliance of
capital and the State as a threat to workers and social justice,63 so they
presumably have little interest in an associational theory that would
extend protection to business enterprises. From the other end of the
political spectrum, Peter Berger and Richard John Neuhaus regard
the facelessness and impersonality of modem life as the problem, so
they tend to treat both the State and the large business enterprise as
61.

See generally VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE SUBSTANCE OF STYLE: HOW THE RISE OF

AESTHETIC VALUE Is REMAKING COMMERCE, CULTURE, AND CONSCIOUSNESS

(2003)

(describing the interactions between the personal preferences of Individuals and the
businesses who seek to meet such preferences).
62. See NISBET, supra note 10, at 283-84 (concluding that for society to truly be
free, the State must embrace associations outside of the State which give people a
sense of identity and thus encourage "a pluralism of functions and loyalties in the
lives of its people"); COUTO & GUTHRIE, supra note 10, at 65-66 (claiming that the fear
of despotism held by the Founding Fathers led to the creation of a government with
multiple checks and balances intended to enable Americans "to pursue life, liberty,
and happiness without government, rather than through its actions').
63. See NISBET, supra note 10, at 204-11 (illustrating the dangers accompanying
the assimilation of government and business through a discussion of totalitarianism,
with a particular focus on Nazi Germany); COUTO & GUTHRIE, supra note 10, at 56-58
(claiming that limited government regulation of the free market system is necessary
to ensure an adequate amount of public goods and to prevent excessive negative
externalities, such as pollution from a factory).
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"megastructures. '' 4 For both progressives on the left and
traditionalists on the right, the business enterprise is somehow
different in kind from the voluntary association.
Given the goals with which such writers start, this approach is
perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, it impoverishes our discussion of
Even if we value associations only
voluntary associations.
instrumentally, we need to recognize that many of the same valuable
functions in voluntary organizations also exist in business enterprises.
For example, which of the following provides more social value: the
community food bank that gives away a loaf of bread, or the
businesses that raised the wheat, milled the flour, baked the loaves,
and delivered them to the food bank?
Society may draw a moral distinction between volunteers and those
who are paid for their efforts, but that goes to their souls, not to the
effects of their labors. With respect to social reform, the profitseeking businesses have not been notably less progressive than labor
organizations. 65 The profit-seeking Brooklyn Dodgers were racially
integrated before the United States Army,6 and but for State passage
of Jim Crow laws at the insistence of other groups, the trains that ran
through the South 67would have been integrated generations before
the Civil Rights

Act.

64. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 10, at 158-59 (explaining that the term
"megastructures" incorporates the State and large corporate institutions, and
discussing the difficulties these megastructures face in efficiently mediating between
the private and public divisions in the modern world).
65. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, ONLY ONE PLACE OF REDRESS: AFRICAN AMERICANS,
LABOR REGULATIONS, AND THE COURTS FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NEW DEAL 54
(2001) (noting the virulent racism in American railroad unions during the early
twentieth century as illustrated by the exclusion of African Americans from the
American Railway Union despite their significant presence in the workforce).
66. Jackie Robinson signed a contract to play baseball with the Brooklyn Dodgers
in 1945. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHNICITY AND SPORTS IN THE UNITED STATES 12-14
(George B. Kirsch et al. eds., 2000) (suggesting that Dodger management may have
been more interested in gaining access to an untapped source of talent than in
altruistically promoting racial equality). Robinson played baseball for the Brooklyn
Dodgers for several years before President Truman proposed integrating the nation's
military. See Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 FED. REG. 4313 (July 28, 1948) (calling for
"equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without
regard to race, color, religion or national origin") (emphasis added).
67. See James Cobb, Segregation: South's Most Infamous Legacy Born in the North,
ATLANTA J. CONST., May 23, 2004, at El (identifying the economic incentive of
railroad companies to provide first-class accommodations to all passengers who could
afford the higher price ticket, regardless of race, and discussing the legislative
response to conflicts arising amongst the mixed race passengers); Michael W.
McConnell, The Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 115, 132 (1994)
(observing that prior to the passage of the first wave of Jim Crow laws, which
mandated segregation of railroad passengers, there was a surprising amount of
integration in the South).
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If we assess the values that mediating institutions are said to
provide, it seems plain that business enterprises also contribute
mightily. Are we concerned about providing training in leadership
and civic responsibility? Few organizations are better at this than
businesses, as is obvious from the number of business people who
regularly play important roles in civic life at all levels. Are we
interested in groups who can ameliorate the facelessness and
atomism of modem society? The Silicon Valley experience, with its
close-knit culture,68 is at the opposite extreme from the faceless
bureaucratic juggernauts of 1950s fantasies like The Man in the Gray
Flannel Suif 9 or The Organization Man.7 ° The small entrepreneurial
enterprises that characterize much of modern capitalism are far less
faceless and more empowering than such entities as the Red Cross or
the United Way. Are we looking for entities that help individuals
shape their identities? For good or ill, businesses have always been in
the forefront of those efforts." Do we seek those who are willing to
advance meanings that challenge those of the State? We need look
no farther than business enterprises, which regularly challenge state
pronouncements and spend considerable amounts of money to get
their meanings across to others.12 Finally, to the extent we are
looking for Garnett's "wrench in the works,"7 for the structural
counterbalance to the State's claims to hegemony, we can find few
groups that better fit the mold than large capitalist enterprises, which

See generally Paul Van Slambrouck, Anthropologists Peer Into a Valley of Silicon,
Jan. 20, 1998 (discussing the unique environment in the
Silicon Valley where employees share knowledge and create vast networks with
colleagues, friends and family, resulting in a situation where the lines between home
and work are often blurred), available at http://csmonitor.com/cgi.com/durable
Redirect.pl?/durable/ 1998/01/20/us/us.2.html.
69. SLOAN WILSON, THE MAN IN THE GRAY FLANNEL SUIT (Four Walls Eight
68.

CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,

Windows 2002) (1955).
70. WILLIAM H. WHYrE, THE ORGANIZATION MAN (Univ. of Pa. Press 2002) (1956).
71. See Andrea McArdle, The Postwar Consumer as Feminized Legal Subject, 27 LEGAL
STUD. F. 221, 232-36 (2003) (describing advertising efforts in the postwar era to
shape women's identities as mothers and consumers by perpetuating the
stereotypical perception of the woman as a homemaker through the use of mass
psychology); Stuart Elliott, The Media Business: Advertising; Kellogg Hopes That Health-

Conscious Women will Want to Have Breakfast with Cindy Crawford, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5,
2000, at C5 (identifying the portrayal of an unrealistic body image as a common
criticism of advertising and the media in general).
72. See, e.g., STUART EWEN, PR!: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF SPIN 357-59, 362-64 (1996)
(describing the efforts of businesses to combat New Deal-era big government
initiatives through public relations campaigns intended to restore faith in the private
sector).
73. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (defining the term "wrench in the
works" as the way in which voluntary associations prevent those in power from
imposing their views on the minority).
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are perhaps the only entities within the State with the skill and
resources to offer significant resistance to State overreaching.
Some may question this description of business enterprises since
businesses have often allied themselves with the State. The melding
of Big Capital and the State has been a popular theme,74 and history is
filled with examples in which forces of the State lined up with
businesses to crush resistance from other groups. 5 However, history
is also filled with examples in which the forces of the State lined up6
with churches or workers or other groups to do the same thing.
That one kind of non-State organization may succeed in allying itself
with the State to crush its enemies does not necessarily mean that
such organizations do not contribute to society. It merely illustrates
that a powerful State, although necessary, can be a dangerous thing.
C.

The Problem.of State Centered Analysis

The point of the foregoing is to emphasize that the distinction
drawn in most discussions between the State, the business enterprise,
and the voluntary association is a convenient fiction. Convenient
fictions accommodate theories advanced by many who write on the
subject of voluntary associations, but they remain fictions at their core
and fall apart if too much weight is placed on them. This is not to say
that the associations themselves are fictional. As Laski notes, when
we consider any group of people with a common life and a common
purpose, "we seem to evolve from it a thing, a personality, that is
beyond the personalities of its constituent parts., 77 The State is
certainly such an entity. Writing in 1917, Laski notes that one who
looks at the battlefields of Europe "will assuredly not deny that
certain personalities, England, France, Germany are real to the
74.

See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing the common concern

that a close affiliation between industry and the State will be detrimental to the
public good).

75. A typical example is the nineteenth century use of the National Guard as
"industrial policemen" to crush labor unions. See JERRY COOPER, THE RISE OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD: THE EVOLUTION OF THE AMERICAN MILITIA, 1865-1920, 4445, 58-63
(1997).
76. The most notorious Church-State alliance was the Spanish Inquisition. See
Simon Lemieux, The Spanish Inquisition,HISTORY REV., Dec. 12, 2002, at 44. The State
has lined up with "workers" against businesses and landowners in places like Cuba,
and with voluntary groups against powerful mercantile interests, as in the abolition of
the slave trade and the temperance movement that led to Prohibition in the United
States. See ANTONI KAPCIA, CUBA: ISLAND OF DREAMS 99-146 (describing the process of
remaking Cuban society); see generally DAVID TURLEY, THE CULTURE OF ENGLISH
ANTISLAVERY, 1780-1860 (1991); John J. Rumbarger, PROFITS, POWER, AND
PROHIBITION: ALCOHOL REFORM AND THE INDUSTRIALIZING OF AMERICA, 1800-1930
(1989).
77. LASKI, supra note 31, at 4.
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soldiers who die for them. '8 He also applies this personification of
the entity beyond the State, noting that Lloyds of London is, to ship
owners, much more than "the mere sum of its individual
underwriters." 79 Such a group entity, he says, quoting Maitland, "is no
fiction, no symbol, no piece of the State's machinery, but a living
organism and a real person, with body and members and will of its
own." ° In this sense the Ford Motor Company is no less (and no
more) "real" than the United States of America. The distinction
between them is not something mystical and fundamental but merely
relates to their membership and purposes.
When we approach the issue in this way, it seems apparent that the
true flourishing of non-State associations cannot occur in a regime in
which they are, in Hobbes's colorful phrase, merely "lesser
commonwealths in the bowels of a greater, like worms in the entrails
of a natural man."8 ' Descriptions of these associations as "mediating
,,82
structures, ' 2 existing for the particular benefits they confer on the
State or the Individual, are unlikely to provide a suitable theoretical
basis, if only because the choice of which organizations should be
fertilized and which pruned will depend on the political and social
views of those who happen to control the machinery of the State. 3
The State has, over the centuries, shown a remarkably flexible
aptitude for siding with religious believers against non-believers, 4
with non-believers against believers, s with big business against insular

78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Vischer, supra note 2, at 958 n.38 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 218
(M. Oakeshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1946) (1651)).
82. See COUTO & GUTHRIE, supra note 10, at 3 (identifying "mediating structures"
as synonymous with the following terms frequently used by other authors: "the
nonprofit sector, intermediate associations, civic associations, or voluntary
associations").
83. The approaches of Garnett, who values associations as structural
counterweights that generate competing meanings, and Mazzone, who values them
insofar as they foster participatory democracy provide an interesting contrast.
Compare Henry Adams's Sou, supra note 3, at 1853-54, with Mazzone, supra note 5, at
711.
84. The paradigm example is always the Spanish Inquisition, but even in the
United States the State has at times deliberately favored religious groups. Until the
1960s, for example, American public schools routinely engaged in Christian prayers
and Bible-reading. See A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 145

(1985).
85.

The attempted destruction of the Catholic Church in Republican Spain and

Mexico and the avowedly atheist States that made up the old Communist bloc come
to mind. See MARY VINCENT, CATHOLICISM IN THE SECOND SPANISH REPUBLIC: RELIGION
AND POLITICS IN SALAMANCA, 1930-1936 250 (1996); MARTIN MCCAULEY, THE SOVIET
UNION SINCE 1917 149 (1981).
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communities, 86 with insular communities against big businesS7 -all
conflicts from which the State emerges more powerful. Justifying
non-State associations solely on their role as mediators in
State/Individual conflicts is unlikely to provide a durable foundation
for a pluralistic society.
We need an approach that allows non-State associations to flourish
as ends in themselves, not as appendages of some larger body. And
that will require us to detach the concept of sovereignty from that of
the State.
II.

DETACHING SOVEREIGNTY FROM THE STATE

This may seem a formidable task. After all, our modern idea of
sovereignty is so intertwined with that of the State that lawyers, for
example, hardly ever deal with it except in connection with the
government. A legal dictionary calls it "the supreme, absolute, and
uncontrollable power by which any independent state is governed."8
Since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the system of international
relations has tied the notion of sovereignty directly to States. 9 But
scholars are now coming to understand that this notion was hardly
inevitable; it was the result of particular processes operating in
particular systems at particular times. 9 Interestingly, the idea of
detaching sovereignty from the State sounds more plausible today
than a generation ago.
In the 1950s, for example, the world was becoming more
concentrated. The common perception was that big institutions were
inevitably going to get bigger and that bureaucracy was going to get
ever more powerful. It was, in short, the world of Orwell's 1984.9'
86. The most vivid examples in American history are the use of State forces to
crush labor unions and other opposition to the powerful mining interests, but
examples are hardly difficult to find. See generally SAMUEL YELLEN, AMERICAN LABOR
STRUGGLES, 1877-1934 (1969) (detailing such events as the Railroad Uprisings, the
Ludlow Massacre, and the Haymarket Bombing).

87.

For example, the Jim Crow laws that forced national railroad enterprises to

segregate their trains were necessary because the profit-seeking businesses were
unwilling to do so voluntarily due to the fact that such a policy would reduce their
profits. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the background to the
segregation of railroad facilities).
88. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1252 (5th ed. 1979).
89. See HIDEAKI SHINODA, RE-EXAMINING SOVEREIGNTY: FROM CLASsICAL THEORY TO
THE GLOBALAGE 14-15 (2000).
90. See HENDRIK SPRuYr, THE SOVEREIGN STATE AND ITS COMPETITORS 153-80
(1995); PHILPOTr, supra note 16, at 97-122.
91. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949); see Mark Schorer, 1940's; When Newspeak Was
New, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at Section 7-63 (describing the novel 1984 as an
"enormously careful and complete account of life in the super-state" whose goal is
"the total destruction of the individual identity"), available at http://query.
nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E2DE153FF935A35753C1A960958260.
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The globe was divided into two great blocs that seemed immutable.
Pluralistic democracies faced in world communism a powerful,
apparently unified totalitarian force that claimed that history was on
its side-a claim with which many agreed. American capitalism had
settled into something that hardly looked less State-like, dominated
by giant corporations, such as AT&T, General Motors, United States
Steel, IBM, Sears Roebuck, Esso and Penn Central-companies so
large that they would inevitably dominate their industries and stifle
all individual innovation. Under this global structure, our future
choices would be determined either by the all-consuming State or the
all-consuming corporation, which would not only decide what we
would eat, wear, and drive, but would even mysteriously control our
thoughts.92
In such a world the idea that States might lose power seemed as
ridiculous as the idea that a Japanese motorbike manufacturer might
significantly contribute to the Chrysler corporation's brush with
bankruptcy, or that the dominant retailer of the future would be a
Ben Franklin franchisee in Bentonville, Arkansas. 3 The metaphor of
the "Iron Curtain" implied more than an ideological divide; it
suggested that the modern State really did have the power to control
everything within its borders and exclude everything without.
We now realize that very little of this was true. The fall of
communism revealed that the totalitarian Soviet State was never as
unified or as powerful (except militarily) as it seemed. We went
through the conglomerate boom of the 1960s and disconglomeration boom of the 1980s. We watched the rise of
Invincible Japan in the 1970s and its fall in the 1990s.
92. See, e.g., VANCE PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 3 (1957) (describing
"large-scale efforts being made, often with impressive success, to channel our
unthinking habits, our purchasing decisions, and our thought processes by the use of
insights gleaned from psychiatry and the social sciences," with the result that "many
of us are being influenced and manipulated, far more than we realize, in the patterns
of our everyday lives").
93. The fact that both of these "ridiculous" ideas actually occurred shows that
public perception may not always be correct and that society may change in
unpredictable ways. See TETSUO SAKIYA, HONDA MOTOR: THE MEN, THE MANAGEMENT,

THE MACHINES 12-13, 134-35 (Kiyoshi Ikemi trans., Timothy Porter ed., 1982)
(describing the expansion of Honda during the 1960s from a company dealing solely
in motorbikes to a major player in the automotive field and the impact that the
introduction of compact cars by Honda and other Japanese automakers had on the
American automobile industry); SAM WALTON, MADE IN AMERICA: MY STORY 32-33

(1992) (describing the founder of Wal-Mart's humble beginnings running a variety
store in the small, "sad-looking country town" of Bentonville, Arkansas); Michael
Massing, Detroit's Strange Bedfellows, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1988, Section 6, at 20
(identifying the increased competition from Japanese automakers, particularly with
regard to the introduction of gas-saving, compact cars to the American market, as a
factor in Chrysler's financial troubles during the late 1970s and early 1980s).
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We are thus in a better position than we were a half-century ago to
realize that this picture has never been particularly accurate, nor has94
it been a fundamental building block of political or social theory.
"Sovereignty" is a concept that has been constructed both internally
and externally. Internally, as noted above, 95 it developed because
particular people, seeking particular powers, discovered theological
and philosophical ideas they found useful in particular conflicts. 96
Externally, it developed because those in power within States found it
useful to find a framework in which to mediate with other States for
particular advantages. 97 The practical uses of sovereignty in the
international arena certainly have never matched the rhetoric. In
practice, sovereignty has taken on a much more fluid and more
pragmatic role. 9s
The sovereign State is also under attack today in ways that it has not
been in recent years, both internally and externally. Internally, many
of those on the left who traditionally have allied with the State
against reactionary groups in society, have begun to realize that
unitary sovereignty is a mixed blessing. That concept, after all, has
played a major role in the subjugation and destruction of various
native societies within larger modern States; claims of Australian
aborigines or Native Americans to some kind of sovereignty have
largely been quashed.9 And others on the left, wary of the power of
94. SeeJENs BARTELSON, A GENEALOGY OF SOVEREIGNrY 237-48 (1995) (tracing the
development of the doctrine of sovereignty and arguing that it is not a fundamental
aspect of political theory, but rather the result of particular historical processes).
95. See supra Part L.A (discussing the development of sovereignty in medieval
Europe).
96. The studies by Laski and Figgis are still the classic descriptions of this process.
See FIGGIs, supra note 18, at 5-6, 13 (comparing monist theories concerning the
sovereign state to the perception during medieval times that the monarch was
bestowed the right to rule by God and thus had unlimited power); LASKI, supra note
31, at 3-6 (introducing the concept of monism, which views the overarching State as
necessary to give meaning to the lives of its citizens).
97. See Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber, The Social Construction of State
Sovereignty, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 1-3 (Thomas J. Biersteker &
Cynthia Weber eds., 1996) (arguing that sovereignty is a "fundamentally contested
concept" that is "a product of the actions of powerful agents and the resistances to
those actions by those located at the margins of power"). Thus, the European States
used the concept to protect themselves from each other at the same time that they
were free to exploit and dominate other native peoples (who did not qualify as
"States") and even their own restive minorities. Id. at 2.
98. See STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HY'POCRISY 40-43 (1999)
(arguing that states have never been as sovereign as theory claims and that the
doctrine of State sovereignty is actually "organized hypocrisy").
99. See VINE DELORIA & CLIFFORD M. LY'LE, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND
FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOvEREIGNTY 25-27 (Univ. of Tex. Press 1998) (1984)
(examining the U.S. government's reluctance throughout the nation's history to
extend sovereign rights to Native American tribes largely due to an inability to
comprehend the non-Eurocentric governing philosophy of the tribes); HENRY
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the State with regard to marginalized groups, have also begun calling
for a concept of sovereignty detached from the State.'00 More
pragmatically, some commentators have observed the practical
disaggregation of sovereignty accomplished by politicians faced with
claims for autonomy by groups from Indonesia to Northern
Ireland.'0 '
Thus, while the idea that unitary sovereignty resides in the State is
still powerful, 0 2 the current contested status of the doctrine is
perhaps illustrated best by the fact that there are no fewer than three
recent books that all share the title Beyond Sovereignty.0 3 Increases in
demands for local autonomy by various groups have often resulted in
creation of quasi-sovereign groups, and theory has thus been
changing to accommodate the new realities. 0 4 Further, over the last
REYNOLDS, ABORIGINAL SOVEREIGNTY. REFLECTIONS ON RACE, STATE AND NATION

16-17,

41 (1996) (suggesting that early English cases examining claims of tribal sovereignty
in Australia were unduly influenced by cultural biases and racist opinions, and
therefore incorrectly determined that the native inhabitants of Australia "had no law
and no sovereignty" prior to colonization by the British); DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN
INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE viii
(1997) (claiming that the U.S. government has historically limited the rights of
Native Americans and that the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court "has actually
contributed to the diminution of the sovereign status of tribes and has placed tribes
and their citizens/members in a virtually destabilized state").
100. See, e.g., Laura Brace &John Hoffman, Introduction: Reclaiming Sovereignty, in
RECLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY 1-6, 2-3 (Laura Brace & John Hoffman eds., 1997)
(introducing a collection of essays which seek to de-link sovereignty from the idea of
statehood); JOHN HOFFMAN, SOVEREIGNTY 18-20 (1998) (arguing that a coherent
account of sovereignty must detach it from the State); cf. Cover, supra note 42, at 6162, 67-68 (arguing that the State has no privilege over other groups in the
development and articulation of legal meanings).
101. See, e.g., Stephen D. Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, in PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 2001) (recognizing that the concept of
sovereignty is comprised of multiple components and finding solutions to common
theoretical problems through the disaggregation of these individual components
from the overarching concept of sovereignty).
102. See MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY

32 (1995) (articulating the continued relevance of unitary sovereignty as a "guide to
an entity's international status," a tool in the resolution of inter-State disputes, and a
measure of the reach of a State's power).
TERRITORY AND POLITICAL
103. E.g., DAVID J. ELKINS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY:
ECONOMY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1995); BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY: COLLECTIVELY
DEFENDING DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAS (Tom Farer ed., 1996); BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY:
ISSUES FOR A GLOBAL AGENDA (Maryann Cusimano Love ed., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter
GLOBAL AGENDA].
104. See HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION:

THE

ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS 333-35 (rev. ed. 1996) (1990) (examining
instances where a limited amount of autonomy has been given to groups within a
sovereign State, usually in response "to geographic, political, ethnic, linguistic, or
other differences within a single sovereignty"); Krasner, supra note 101, at 20-21
(illustrating the idea of quasi-sovereignty through the situation in Hong Kong,
which, although a part of the sovereign state of China, has been allowed to maintain
its own judicial system); see also KRASNER, supra note 98, at 71-72 (noting that
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half century the legitimacy of violence as a normal instrument of
statecraft, both domestically and internationally, has declined among
developed countries. °5 To the extent that the State's primary role is
to control and channel organized violence, it becomes relatively less
important as the threat of international violence decreases.
The sweeping technological and social changes that have made
national borders more permeable are also impacting sovereignty.
The old idea of sovereignty reflected a certain level of technology,
when intrusion into a State required physical intrusion, and in which
the State could, with relative ease, control its borders and those who
acted within them. But modern technology and social structures
have destabilized the old stasis.'0 6 Modern mass communications, the
rise of multinational corporations and other international nongovernmental organizations, and the growing globalization of trade
have made the old territorial State less powerful and less able to
control its own citizens. The global communications revolution
makes it more difficult for States to keep alien ideas outside their
borders. °7 Issues of crime and environmental degradation, once
inherently local, are increasingly transnational problems that
individual States cannot solve on their own. 0 8 No one knows how this
will effect our future concept of sovereignty, but there is no shortage
of guesses.0
The point of all this is merely to show that the concept of
detaching sovereignty from the State is not as far-fetched as it once
seemed. The international arena, the place where States historically
have been at their most State-like, is now a growing web of
multinational institutions, both private and public, making it harder
institutions have become embedded into the foundation of the State and thus have a
tremendous impact on State action).
105. See JOHN L. GADDIS, THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR,
1941-1947, at 353-61 (rev. ed. 2000) (1972) (arguing that the decreasing legitimacy
of violence in the international arena is one of the causes that led to the collapse of
the Soviet Union).
106. See VIRGINIA POSTREL, THE FuTURE AND ITS ENEMIES 193-94 (1999) (recognizing
that recent technical innovations and social developments have caused boundaries to
blur, but not disappear entirely, and have created global society dynamically on the
verge "between formerly segregated economies, nations, and cultures; between home
and work, male and female, East and West, children and adults").
107. See MONROE E. PRICE, MEDIA AND SOVEREIGNTY: THE GLOBAL INFORMATION
REVOLUTION AND ITS CHALLENGE TO STATE POWER 3-29 (2002) (analyzing difficulties

States face in a world of increasing global information transparency).
108. See generally GLOBAL AGENDA, supra note 103 (collecting essays on issues that
transcend State borders and that require multilateral support, such as terrorism, the
drug trade, and ecological dilemmas).
109. See, e.g., BEYOND NATIONALISM?: SOVEREIGNTY AND CITIZENSHIP (Fred R.
Dallmayr & Jos6 M. Rosales eds., 2001) (collecting essays addressing the impact of
the increasingly interconnected global community on sovereignty).
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to draw sharp distinctions between private and public entities.
Domestically, claims for sovereignty by marginalized groups,
distrustful of central authority, are also challenging the notion that
the State and the community are one." ° This changing environment
means that an approach to voluntary associations that rejects the idea
of the monistic State is theoretically and practically possible.
III. TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE THEORY OF ASSOCIATIONS

If we abandon the theory of the monistic State, what would our
theory of associations look like? The answer is far from clear, but the
general outlines of that approach are not. It will need to be rooted in
the pluralist vision that the State is not the sole originator and
interpreter of law. It will have to recognize that all associations in
society, from the federal government down to the smallest and most
marginalized group, are formally equal and are entitled to dignity
and consideration-to sovereignty in their own affairs. Formal equality
does not mean actualequality; the State is likely to remain the most
powerful association for the foreseeable future. But formal equality is
important. The police officer and the criminal are not actually equal;
the former has the lawful power to restrain the latter. But they are
formally equal, which means that the officer may only use that power
within lawful limits, infringing the other's autonomy only to the
extent necessary to carry out her function.
A.

Pluralism

The pluralist thesis is that the State is but one of a number of
associations within society."' These associations share sovereignty over
aspects of communal life. Each of these groups is organized for a
purpose, and each is an end in itself, not merely a piece of the
"State's machinery."' 2 Some groups are organized for religious
worship, some are organized for common defense and the
maintenance of public order (the State), some are organized for the
production of goods and services (the business enterprises), some for
charitable or social or recreational purposes (the voluntary
associations) -but all are sovereign.

110. See supra note 100 (discussing the separation of sovereignty from the state).
111. See Howe, supra note 40, at 91 (noting that the center of the pluralist theory is
that the State does not possess sovereignty exclusively).
112. See MAITLAND, supra note 11, at xxi (arguing that associations, here called
corporations, are fictions of law controlled by the State, and that as "artificial
persons" these associations have no natural rights and are instead "a wheel in the
State's machinery").
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This means that in an important sense all associations are equal,
from the United States Supreme Court to the Ku Klux Klan, from
Microsoft Corporation to Amnesty International, from the Catholic
Church to a bowling league. They are formally equal in the sense that
they are ends in themselves, with power over their own spheres of
action. They are not, however, factually equal. Some are powerful,
some weak; some are popular, others unpopular; some are
influential, others marginalized, or even persecuted. But that formal
is important. It is,
equality, while sometimes derided as a "cnon,
after all, the basis of the rule of law.
When, for example, a group of people gather in a courtroom, the
judge has power over the group. That power will be enforced, if
necessary, by bloodshed." 4 But in exercising that power the judge is
not superior to the litigants. A judge is charged with making the
decision that one party must go to jail, or pay damages to another.
But our notions of formal equality require her to respect the
autonomy and dignity of all the other participants. Ajudge may not,
for example, base her decision on her own advantage. The judge's
relationship to the litigants is not that of the corporation to its
subsidiaries; they do not exist for the judge's benefit nor are they, in
general, under the judge's command. Obviously, some litigants will
have more power than others-some because the judge shares their
values rather than those of their opponents, others because they have
the political or economic power to bend the judge to their wishes. If
the litigants are valued primarily for the benefits they confer on the
judge, these influences are perfectly legitimate. But if we view the
litigants as equal, and as entitled to equal respect and equal
treatment, these influences are illegitimate. The way we analyze the
process is obviously important.
Some years ago the sociologist Robert MacIver distilled much of
this thinking into his work on "the great associations. " "' By "great
associations" MacIver meant the three large entities that have most
shaped the world:
the State, the church, and the business
enterprise.1 6 According to MacIver, the State is frequently confused

113. See, e.g., Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work,
and the Confirmation Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1283, 1317 (1992) (arguing that our
legal system is based on the idea of formal equality and free association but that
reliance on these ideas often means overlooking particular harms that result from
factual inequalities).
114. That bloodshed is rarely needed to enforce judicial decisions does not mean
that its availability as an ultimate resort is not ever-present in the proceedings.
115. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 165-82.
116. Id.
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with the community, but in reality it is just one form of social
The State itself is an
organization within the community. 117
association, a specific organization within the society, not different in
kind from the other great associations. " "
Another sociologist, the German Karl Hertz, subsequently explored
MacIver's thesis." 9 Hertz's articulation of what he calls "the MacIver
Laski.12 0
doctrine" has strong parallels in the work of Maitland and
Agreeing with McIver, Hertz states that the concept, "that state,
church, corporation and so on are associations within the
community, not identical with it, is a doctrine of limited
This does not mean merely that non-State
sovereignty." 21
associations exercise limited sovereignty within the State-as if the
State's power is delegated to them-but that the State itself is limited
in its sovereignty.
Hertz somewhat overstates the originality of MacIver's insight but
he recognizes its theoretical importance:
By also identifying economic and religious associations as "great
associations," [Maclver] gives them places of equal importance and
provides a theoretical framework for the discussion of the norms
governing the relations among these "great associations."... What
he contends for is, first, a particular view of the nature of "the great
associations;" what he demands, second, is that we see the rights
these "associations" in light of their constitutions
and obligations of
122
and relationships.
MacIver's emphasis on the "great associations" is too narrow. The
claim that church, business, and state are the sovereign entities
Thus, where these three
suggests that there are no others.
"sovereignties" tend to agree (as, perhaps, in Franco's Spain) or
where the State has outlawed or co-opted religious and economic
organizations (as in the Soviet Union), MacIver's theory might
suggest that there is little or no reason for other groups to complain.

117. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 183 (noting that the State is but one social
agent and not the source of ultimate power within society); see also supra Part L.A
(discussing the concept of the state and its role in defining a social community).
118. Id. at 165 (noting that other "great associations" are neither part of the State
nor subject to it, but rather they "exist in their own right" as the State does).
119. See Karl Hertz, The Nature of Voluntary Associations, in VOLUNTARY
ASSOCIATIONS:

A STUDY OF GROUPS IN FREE SOCIETIES 17, 17 (D.B. Robertson ed.,

1966) (arguing that Maclver created the modern theory of organizations within the
social order).
120. These writers, along with Gierke, often use the terms of "fellowship" or
"corporation"-the latter in its older sense of any organized group of people with
legal status-to describe these groups.
121. See Hertz, supra note 119, at 18.
122. Id.
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But that ignores the fact that powerful human aspirations and values
are embodied in a host of private, secular, non-business entities, from
small, marginalized groups like the proto-feminist reading groups
that Mazzone studies,1 2 3 to large influential groups such as the Sierra
Club and the NAACP. While MacIver's focus on the largest and most
important organizations is understandable, the broader visions of
Gierke, Maitland, and Laski, which recognize the same rights even in
smaller secular entities, are more consistent with the pluralist vision.
The difficulty with the pluralist approach-and the reason it has
never been popular-is that while it is normative, in the sense that it
values pluralism and associational autonomy, it lacks a unifying
political vision. It values human dignity, but it does not call for any
particular result of the process, and that leaves it with few friends.
The theory that associations should be permitted to decide things for
themselves necessarily entails the possibility that they may decide
things that others in the community find reprehensible. Thus, those
who share the same ideological goals may find themselves at opposite
ends of the argument when it comes to taking pluralism seriously.
Some have argued, for example, that decoupling sovereignty from
the State and allowing pluralism to flourish would empower
marginalized groups, like racial and sexual minorities. 2 4 But others
have come to the opposite conclusion, arguing that pluralism will
legitimize pervasive ideologies of racism and sexism.'2 5 Robert Cover,
an anti-racist and incorrigible pluralist, tried to develop a framework
for resolving a particular legal dispute among groups that involved a
clash over substantive world-views-specifically, the battle over the tax
exemption of fundamentalist Bob Jones University 2 6-but his distaste
27
for the university's position led him ultimately to duck the question.

123. See Mazzone, supra note 5, at 642 (describing the growth of women's reading
clubs since the establishment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony). These reading
groups were originally organized by the Puritan establishment in order to promote
the reading of religious texts. Id. Over the next three hundred years, however, these
clubs increased in importance and size. Id. Women, politically marginalized, used
these clubs to discuss important social and economic changes, particularly by the
time of the Civil War. Id.
124. See, e.g., supra note 100.
125. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH.
L. REv. 685, 752 (1992) (noting that Cover fails to take into account hierarchical

structures within "law making" associations and groups); Peter Margulies, The Violence
of Law and Violence Against Women, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 179, 179 (1996)
(arguing that Cover's vision of the State as "jurispathic" overlooks the important role

the courts play in protecting vulnerable groups, such as women).
126. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
127. See Cover, supranote 42, at 66-67.
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B.

MultilateralAssociationalRelations

Accepting the pluralist vision, however, does not tell us how we
ought to go about ordering the relationships among associations.
But merely phrasing the question this way has taken us a great
distance from the questions "how should the State go about
regulating associations[?]" or "which associations ought to be
protected from State interference[?]" If we recognize associations
(including the State) as equals, and recognize that they each bear
their own sovereignties in their own spheres, then we need a theory
of how to mediate among them. We need, in Hertz's phrase, a theory
of "multilateral associational relations."1 8
Within any society, groups will be in conflict-civil rights activists
and racists, abortion providers and abortion opponents, management
and labor, believers and non-believers, gays and straights. In any
society there are mechanisms to mediate the conflicts among these
groups. In the most primitive societies, these mechanisms involve a
range of factors from customs to religious mediation to armed
violence. The same is true in modem societies, but in modern
society we have put control of armed violence in the hands of State
associations.1 29 Yet, the ultimate power to mediate any dispute among
groups resides in the State and often its courts.
This notion of the State as a final arbiter is problematic. In 1787,
Madison stated that no one ought to be trusted to be the judge in her
own case.2 0 The temptations to bias or corruption are too powerful.
And if one man cannot be trusted, there is even less reason to trust a
group. 1' The State is regularly in conflict with other associations in
society, and in those conflicts it is both the party and the judge.
For example, when the State decides that a religious university
S 132
must permit interracial dating to qualify for a tax exemption, or
that a civic organization must admit women, 32 or that the Air Force
may forbid officers to wear yarmulkes,13 4 the State's thumb is always
128.
129.

See Hertz, supra note 119, at 18.
See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 187 (noting that the state is perfectly situated

130.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 37, at 44.

to take on this role, and is able to do so more thoroughly or adequately than
individuals or organizations).
131. Id.
132. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595 (1983) (holding that
schools that discriminate based on race cannot be deemed to be conferring a public
benefit such as to qualify for charitable tax-exemption status).
133. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (holding that
the Jaycees, a civil association organized for the advancement of young men, could
not exclude women pursuant to the Minnesota Human Rights Act).
134. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (holding that the Air
Force's regulation of military attire did not violate First Amendment rights to
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on the scales, either directly or indirectly. 35 Those conflicting roles
have the potential to warp its judgments and create the obvious
problems of corruption.
The trouble is that now the only limits to that pressure are those
that arise when (i) one State association tries to do something that is
properly under the authority of another State association, 1 6 or
(ii) where the State has infringed on the rights of the Individual. So
long as it acts within its own jurisdiction vis-ci-vis other State
associations, and does not trample on the rights of Individuals, the
State is free to privilege its own views and interests over those of other
associations.
A theory of multilateral associational relationships would view the
State's infringement on individual rights as illegitimate; unavoidable,
perhaps, given the present state of human perfection, but something
to be carefully watched and deliberately combated. 7 The norms
articulated by the State, in the pluralist view, are not entitled to any
privilege over those of other associations.138 True, State norms may
have to be imposed on other groups to accomplish the legitimate
purposes that are within the State's charter. The reasonable needs of
public order and national defense are legitimate concerns of the39
State, and contrary views of other associations may have to yield.1
Similarly, its members may properly ask the State to accomplish other
purposes, such as building infrastructure, alleviating poverty, or
eradicating racism.'4° But in asserting its own rules over those of
other associations the State inevitably infringes on their autonomy. It
also lessens the ability of these associations to carry out their own
missions. Thus, there is always harm to the fabric of associational
relations even when the State's infringement is widely agreed to be
just and fair.
religious expression).
135. In Goldman it was the State's interest in managing its own operations, while in
Bob Jones University and Roberts the issue was its intent to carry out social policies the
State had adopted as being in the public interest.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the
individual states, rather than the federal government, had the power to proscribe
guns in school zones).
137. See Hertz, supra note 119, at 33 (arguing that a pluralistic concept fights any
unilateral control of one sphere of life by any one association).
138. Id.
139. See MACIVER, supra note 12, at 187.
140. Even in the international arena, States may reasonably choose to use military
force to carry out policy objectives that are not, strictly speaking, related to their
ordinary self-preservation. The Clinton administration's decision to invade Haiti to

promote democracy and alleviate the suffering of the Haitian people is an example.
See generally DAVID M. MALONE, DECISION-MAKING IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL: THE
CASE OF HArri, 1990-1997 (1998).
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To prevent unnecessary harm to other associations, the State must
act in accord with law. But this is not merely the "law" as articulated
by the State. Traditional legal theory posits that the State and its
various appendages are the manufacturers of law, either through the
usual process of its legislatures and administrative organs or, in the
case of disputes where such rules are not clear, its courts. 14' The
classic account is that of the English legal theorist H.L.A. Hart, 42 but
it is widely reflected in American jurisprudence in writers as diverse as
44 and in the Supreme Court's
Justice Cardozo, 43 Judge Posner,
145
constitutional interpretations.

But just as the State is not coextensive with the community, law is
not coextensive with the State's articulation of it. The State is the
association that enforces the law, and it has some role in articulating
the law, but it does not make the law. Robert Cover explained that
the law bubbles up from underneath, in the contested interpretations
of right and wrong of the various groups meeting and interacting in
society. 1 6 Cover was a radical anti-Statist, but he was not anti-law, and
his approach is the antithesis of the Critical Legal Studies approach
that equates law with brute politics.

47

Law is, rather, a natural

outgrowth of human interactions, and groups in society generate
competing legal meanings like a rain forest sprouts foliage.148 The
State enforces legal meanings, but it does not create them. When
judges decide cases on behalf of the State, they simply pick from the
competing meanings that others have already generated. This is
important, because it means that the legal meanings advanced by any
association are entitled to as much respect and consideration as those
of a State association,
even when that association is the United States
49
Supreme Court.'
141.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 124-36, 272-76 (2d ed. 1994).

142. Id.
143. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20-21, 167
(1921).
144. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 197-203 (1990)
(noting that there are an infinite number of legal questions to which judges do not
have the answers).
145. There is a sophisticated variation of this basic civics concept which is much
heard in law schools. This variation states that the Constitution says what five Justices
say it says.
146. Cover, supra note 42, at 4.
147. See Snyder, supra note 15, at 1654-55 & n.151 (explaining that Cover's views
do not fit into any of the established legal theory perspectives).
148. See Cover, supra note 42, at 7 (noting that our society is held together
through the force of "interpretive commitments" that define what law should be).
149. Id. at 28 (arguing that the legal interpretations asserted by judges are not
objectively superior and providing the example that the Mennonite understanding of
the First Amendment has an equal or superior status to the understanding of the
United States Supreme Court).
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Other associations therefore have no obligation to view the
Supreme Court as infallible merely because it is, in some sense,
final. 150 To the extent there ever were "final" words from the
Supreme Court, that day is passed. Other associations know that a
change in Court membership may swing the State around to their
side of a disputed issue. This instability is a fundamental problem.
The availability of State power to coerce other associations is an
invitation to associations to ally with it or co-opt it for their own
purposes. Any given instance of this may be entirely benign-the
State's (belated) role in addressing racial discrimination is an
example-but the result is increasing intellectual warfare, with
attempts by all groups involved in a particular question to use State
force to disable their opponents.
The State, then, must be bound by law. And the State has no
monopoly on the meaning of law. It follows from this that the State's
power over other associations should be strongest in areas where the
law is not fundamentally contested.
Where there is general
among
the
associations
in
the community on the
agreement
legitimacy of a law-and the vast majority of our public and private
law is of this sort-the State is unlikely to infringe on the sovereignty
of a group by applying those laws to it. But where the law is
fundamentally contested, as where significant associations in society
reject the legitimacy of the rule, the State must tread carefully. In
such cases there may be a legitimate reason to impose a contested
51
meaning by force, but such situations should be relatively rare.1
52
To illustrate this point, the Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade
that a woman has, to some extent, a constitutional right to choose an
abortion. 153 The Roe decision, involves a fundamentally contested
legal meaning. The opponents of Roe do not merely argue that the
law is undesirable in the same way that a group of manufacturers
might argue that an import tariff is too low or a given smokestack
regulation is too costly. The opponents of Roe contend that it is not
"law" at all.154 They do not agree with the State's articulation of the
rule, and they are unwilling to defer to it. They agree that the
150.

See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("We

are not final because we are infallible, we are infallible only because we are final.").
151. The great desegregation battles in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, were
fundamentally a struggle among State associations. The segregated schools and the
Jim Crow laws were State creations. Abolishing the practices that did not intrude on
the sovereignty of non-State associations.
152. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

153. Id. at 153.
154. See Cover, supra note 42, at 8 (noting that opponents of Roe v. Wade believe
the Supreme Court has sanctioned murder).
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governing law is the Constitution, but they vigorously dispute the
In a pluralist world, their meaning is as
Constitution's meaning.
good as anybody's, including the Court's.
To the extent, then, that the State backs its own interpretation, it
inevitably conflicts with the associations that take a contrary view. But
that does not mean that it is powerless. The State does not infringe
on the sovereignty of other associations if it removes its own criminal
It does not implicate associational
sanctions for abortion.16
sovereignty if it chooses to fund abortions through its own medical
programs. Or if it prosecutes those who destroy property or injure
other persons or disrupt the operations of those who are engaged in
the abortion process, at least if it is applying the same standards that
it would apply to all other breaches of the peace. These are all
legitimate exercises of the State's own authority.
But it is another thing entirely for the State to compel other
associations to adopt its meaning. It infringes the sovereignty of
other associations if, for example, it compels religious hospitals to
perform abortions or requires employers to offer abortion coverage
through health plans. This is not because Roe essentially implicates
religious beliefs (though it obviously does) and religious beliefs have
a special status under the First Amendment.5 7 The issue here is the
same whether the objection to abortion is religious or secular. Where
the meaning is fundamentally contested, it is generally illegitimate
for the State to impose its meaning on other associations and compel
their acquiescence. 58 The origins of the objection, whether religious
or secular, are unimportant.
Another example is the debate over race-based preferences in
education. The Supreme Court has narrowly held that at least some
affirmative action is appropriate for purposes of diversity in
education. 59 The Court has also held that some sorts of race-based

155. Id. at 19.
156. Just as it does not infringe on the sovereignty of any group if it, for example,
requires its school teachers to refrain from classroom prayers or prohibits its police
from prosecuting flag burners.
157. See generally Cover, supra note 100, at 19 (discussing Constitutional
interpretation and the idea that different groups rely on different sources as the
foundation for their interpretation, particularly in the area of religion and the First
Amendment).
158. Id. at 68 (arguing that legal meaning is a restraint on power and that legal
norms should not be circumscribed).
159. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003) (holding that the interest in
attaining diversity at the University of Michigan Law School was a compelling
interest, and that its affirmative action policy was narrowly tailored to achieve this
end). As such, the policy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 342.
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preferences are not permissible. ° These are fragile holdings,
however, and could conceivably be undone by a single change in the
Supreme Court's membership. The idea of race-based preferences is
fundamentally contested in our society. A great many private
educational institutions believe that it is not only constitutional, but
in a sense even required by our common notions of equality and
opportunity. The point is that if the Supreme Court subsequently
decides that race-based preferences are unconstitutional at State
institutions, it is acting within the scope of its sovereign authority.
But if it purports to impose that understanding on, for example, Yale
University, a private institution, and forbids Yale to take race into
decisions, it is impermissibly interfering with
account in admissions
6
another association.1 '
There may be some objection to the formulation, that "general
agreement among the associations in the community" is the relevant
standard. A general agreement is not a perfect agreement; there will
always be dissenters. This formulation leaves open the possibility that
the meanings of some small and marginalized groups will not get the
same protection offered to larger and more politically powerful
groups. But for at least two reasons, "general agreement" is likely to
be the most realistic option. First, unanimity within any community is
impossible; the world is full of too many competing meanings to
ensure that no one is ever burdened by a legal meaning he or she
contests. The practicalities of ordinary life require that meanings too
narrow or obscure will generally be ignored. Second, and more
important, a pluralist view of associations is not going to make the
situation of these groups worse. True, a small and powerless
association may still be overborne by State power. Under a pluralist
vision, the practitioners of a small and marginalized group who seek
to engage in activities ordinarily banned by the State may still lose,
but they were already losing. 62

160. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275 (2003) (holding that the point
system used by the University of Michigan's undergraduate program was not
narrowly tailored). As such, this policy did violate the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
at 342.
161. As it now stands, it is possible that if Grutter is overruled a private institution
may be required to eliminate its race-based preferences under Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2004), because the Supreme Court has held
that any discrimination that would be unconstitutional for a State action is
punishable if done by an organization that receives federal funds. See Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001).
162. See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that
practitioners of Native American religion had no constitutional right to use peyote in

a religious ceremony).
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CONCLUSION

If our goals are instrumental, we may be well-served by a theory of
associations that make them "mediating" institutions, put here to
influence, channel, or mask the power of the State. If our goal is not
the rampant flourishing of a rain forest of associations, but rather the
careful care and pruning of valuable plants in a well-tended garden,
we may prefer the monist vision of the State and elect to argue over
which associations should be privileged and which not. We must be
careful, however. This will certainly be a political battle, and that
means that the associations with the most political strength at the
moment will likely be favored.
We are often tempted to channel the power of the State for good
ends. The State, after all, has the power to desegregate the schools
and eradicate discrimination in housing, or to protect a woman's
right to an abortion and a same-sex couple's rights to create a family.
The problem is that it can do exactly the opposite-and has. It can
segregate as well as integrate, persecute as well as protect. The
monist vision means that we trust the State over all other associations
as the one true keeper of meaning.
But it need not be so. If we value the human dignity that allows
people to work for common ends in organized groups, and if we
value the things that non-State associations do in society, we are best
served by a theory of associations that rejects the State's claims of
superior authority. We are best served by the pluralist vision.

